chore(deps): update dependency ash_authentication to ~> 4.15.0 [security] - autoclosed #568

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renovate wants to merge 1 commit from renovate/hex-ash_authentication-vulnerability into main
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This PR contains the following updates:

Package Type Update Change
ash_authentication prod minor ~> 4.13.0 → ~> 4.15.0

OAuth2/OIDC account takeover in AshAuthentication via email-based user matching

CVE-2026-49757 / EEF-CVE-2026-49757 / GHSA-777c-2fxx-qr28

More information

Details

Summary

Authentication Bypass by Spoofing vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows account takeover of local users via OAuth2/OIDC sign-in.

AshAuthentication's OAuth2 and OIDC family strategies matched the local user by email address (an upsert on the email field, or a user-defined sign-in filter) rather than by the OpenID Connect iss/sub claim combination. Per OpenID Connect Core §5.7, only iss/sub uniquely and stably identifies an end-user; other claims, including email, MUST NOT be used as unique identifiers.

A provider login presenting a victim's email, including an unverified email, a reused email, or an account with email_verified: false, resolved to and signed in as the victim's existing local account. An unauthenticated attacker who can register an account on any accepted OAuth provider with the victim's email (or who benefits from provider-side email reuse or reclamation) obtains the victim's full local privileges.

The fix resolves users by the (strategy, sub) identity stored in a user identity resource, and only links a new sub to an existing local account by email when the provider's email_verified claim is trusted (trust_email_verified?).

This issue affects ash_authentication from 0.1.0 before 4.14.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.10.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 9.2 / 10 (Critical)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV.


AshAuthentication vulnerable to OAuth2/OIDC account takeover via email-based user matching

CVE-2026-49757 / EEF-CVE-2026-49757 / GHSA-777c-2fxx-qr28

More information

Details

Summary

AshAuthentication's OAuth2 and OIDC family strategies matched the local user by email address rather than by the OpenID Connect iss/sub claim combination. A provider login presenting a victim's email (including an unverified, reused, or email_verified: false account) resolved to and signed in as the victim's existing local account. An unauthenticated attacker who can register an account on any accepted OAuth provider with the victim's email obtains the victim's full local privileges.

Details

Per OpenID Connect Core §5.7, only the iss/sub claim combination uniquely and stably identifies an end-user; any other claim, including email, MUST NOT be used as a unique identifier. AshAuthentication's OAuth2/OIDC register flow nonetheless drove the upsert by the email field (upsert_identity on email, or a user-defined sign-in filter), and the sign-in preparation filtered users by email.

1. Provider login. The attacker signs in to a configured OAuth/OIDC provider with the victim's email. This is trivial for providers that don't verify email ownership, and possible under email-reuse / reclamation for providers that do.

2. AshAuthentication register step. 'Elixir.AshAuthentication.Strategy.OAuth2.IdentityChange':change/3 invokes the upsert action whose upsert_identity resolves on the email. The action lands on the victim's existing record.

3. Sign-in preparation. 'Elixir.AshAuthentication.Strategy.OAuth2.SignInPreparation':prepare/3 does not verify the returned user against an iss/sub identity, so the attacker is authenticated as the victim.

Configurations

Exploitation requires one of:

  • The configured OAuth/OIDC provider does not reliably verify email ownership (lets a user register with any email, or fails to verify it). Many social/enterprise providers fall into this category, including Slack, generic OIDC deployments, and any custom OAuth2 endpoint without strict email validation.
  • The provider allows email reclamation: the victim's email becomes available on the provider (account deletion, organisation off-boarding, mail-host change) and the attacker registers it. The attacker then signs in via that provider and takes over the local account.

Providers that strictly verify email ownership and forbid reuse (e.g. modern Google Workspace, GitHub for accounts that have completed verification) are not directly exploitable, but applications that accept any of the affected strategy types in addition are still exposed via the weaker providers in the set.

PoC
  1. On any accepted OAuth/OIDC provider, register an account whose email is the victim's email (or use a provider that allows email reuse).
  2. Complete the standard OAuth flow against the AshAuthentication application.
  3. The application's upsert resolves on email, signs the attacker in as the victim, and returns a session token for the victim's account.
Impact

Unauthenticated remote account takeover against any AshAuthentication-using application that exposes an OAuth2/OIDC strategy. The default configuration of every affected strategy is vulnerable; no application-level misconfiguration is required. An attacker who succeeds gains the victim's full local identity, with read, write, and destructive access to whatever the victim's account can do.

References

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 9.2 / 10 (Critical)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).


Purpose-limited JWT accepted as full bearer authentication in AshAuthentication

CVE-2026-65633 / EEF-CVE-2026-65633 / GHSA-6vcj-3h59-rrc3

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Details

Summary

Improper Authentication vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows purpose-limited JWTs to be replayed as full bearer API credentials when a resource uses stateless bearer-token verification.

The bearer-token authentication helper AshAuthentication.Plug.Helpers.retrieve_from_bearer/3 verifies an Authorization: Bearer JWT's signature and rejects tokens containing an act claim, but performs no check that the token's purpose claim equals user at the bearer boundary. When the resource is configured with require_token_presence_for_authentication?: false (the DSL default), the follow-on validate_token/3 helper returns {:ok, nil} without consulting the token resource, so no downstream check on purpose takes place either. As a result, any valid, non-expired JWT the library itself issued for a narrow, single-purpose flow (most notably the purpose: sign_in token that WebAuthn always emits during sign-in, and that the Password strategy emits when sign-in tokens are enabled) is accepted directly as a general-purpose bearer credential and resolves to a full current_user assignment.

This bypasses the library's intended token-exchange contract, in which the sign_in token is meant to be presented exactly once to a preparation that validates the purpose claim and immediately revokes the token. The first use of a still-valid sign-in token presented directly in the Authorization header succeeds because the stateless bearer path never scopes it to purpose == "user".

An attacker who obtains a not-yet-exchanged sign-in token for a target subject (for example via log or referrer leakage, an intercepted magic-link delivery channel, or a partially compromised intermediary) can present it as a bearer token and be authenticated as that subject, fully bypassing the intended one-time-use and revocation semantics. Exploitation additionally requires that the host application wire up retrieve_from_bearer/3 on a reachable route and uses either WebAuthn (sign-in tokens are always issued) or the Password strategy with sign_in_tokens_enabled?: true. Resources configured with require_token_presence_for_authentication?: true (including applications scaffolded by the Igniter installer since v4.5.0) and the session-based path (authenticate_resource_from_session/4) enforce purpose == "user" against the stored token record and are not affected.

This issue affects ash_authentication: from 3.10.5 before 4.14.2 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.13.

Configurations

The bypass is reachable only when a resource uses stateless bearer-token verification, i.e. require_token_presence_for_authentication? is false (the DSL default). In that mode validate_token/3 returns {:ok, nil} without consulting the token resource, so the JWT's purpose claim is the only remaining scoping signal at the bearer boundary and it is never checked. When require_token_presence_for_authentication? is true, validate_token/3 looks the token up with get_token(%{"jti" => jti, "purpose" => "user"}); purpose-limited tokens are stored under their own purpose (sign_in, remember_me, ...), so that lookup fails and those tokens are rejected. Applications scaffolded by the Igniter installer since v4.5.0 default to require_token_presence_for_authentication?: true and are therefore not exposed as generated; applications configured manually or that deliberately opt into stateless JWT verification are.

Exploitation additionally requires the host application to wire up AshAuthentication.Plug.Helpers.retrieve_from_bearer/3 on a route the attacker can reach, and to use a strategy that issues purpose-limited JWTs carrying a resolvable sub claim: either the WebAuthn strategy (sign-in tokens are always emitted, no opt-in required) or the Password strategy with sign_in_tokens_enabled?: true. The session-based path (authenticate_resource_from_session/4) already enforces purpose == "user" against the token resource and is not affected.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 7.6 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV.


CVE-2026-66882 / EEF-CVE-2026-66882 / GHSA-54fc-x3hv-ffhw

More information

Details

Summary

Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS) vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows reflected cross-site scripting via the confirmation and magic link interaction forms.

When a strategy is configured with require_interaction? set to true, AshAuthentication serves an intermediate HTML page asking the user to confirm the action by submitting a form. Both such pages embed a request parameter directly into a hidden input's value attribute without HTML escaping: lib/ash_authentication/add_ons/confirmation/confirmation_form.html.eex interpolates the confirm parameter, and lib/ash_authentication/strategies/magic_link/sign_in_form.html.eex interpolates the magic link token parameter. These templates are compiled with EEx.function_from_file/3 using plain <%= %> expressions, which perform no escaping, so the parameter is reflected verbatim.

Neither accept handler validates the value before rendering it. AshAuthentication.AddOn.Confirmation.Plug.accept/2 only checks that a confirm key is present, and AshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.Plug.accept/2 reads the parameter directly, so no token signature is verified at this stage and arbitrary attacker-supplied text reaches the template. An unauthenticated attacker can therefore craft a URL whose parameter terminates the attribute and injects markup, for example a quote followed by a <script> element. Because the accept phase is served over GET, loading the crafted link is sufficient; no form submission or prior authentication is required.

The injected script executes in the origin of the application embedding AshAuthentication, giving it access to that origin's cookies, session, and same-origin responses. Since these pages are part of the authentication flow, a victim following what appears to be a legitimate confirmation or sign-in link is a plausible target.

This issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.8.0 before 4.14.2 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.13.

Configurations

Only strategies configured with require_interaction? set to true are affected. This option defaults to false, and when it is disabled the vulnerable accept route is not registered at all, so the affected pages cannot be reached.

The option is not obscure: AshAuthentication's own documentation for the confirmation add-on advises that applications using AshAuthenticationPhoenix should enable it, so the affected configuration is a documented and recommended deployment rather than an unusual one.

At least one of the following must be configured with require_interaction? true:

  • the confirmation add-on, which serves the affected confirmation accept form; or
  • the magic_link strategy, which serves the affected sign-in accept form.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 2.1 / 10 (Low)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV.


Remember-me sign-in guard reads a session key that is never written in ash_authentication, allowing session replacement

CVE-2026-76949 / EEF-CVE-2026-76949 / GHSA-hh34-374j-pfr5

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Details

Summary

Authentication Bypass by Spoofing vulnerability in team-alembic ash_authentication allows an attacker who can plant a remember-me cookie in a victim's browser to replace that victim's authenticated session with one for the attacker's own account.

AshAuthentication.Plug.Helpers.sign_in_using_remember_me/3 skips re-authenticating an already-signed-in visitor by checking the session for "<subject_name>_token", but store_in_session/2 writes that key only when require_token_presence_for_authentication? is enabled and otherwise writes the bare subject name. At the default setting the guard therefore reads a key that is never written, its already-signed-in branch is unreachable, and the remember-me sign-in runs on every request through the per-request browser pipeline plug. A planted remember-me cookie is consequently honoured even for a visitor holding a live authenticated session, so whatever the victim enters afterwards lands in data the attacker controls. The read path in authenticate_resource_from_session/4 selects the key correctly, so the guard and the reader disagree about which key holds the session.

This issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.10.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.

Impact

An attacker who can set a remember-me cookie in a victim's browser silently replaces the victim's authenticated session with one for the attacker's own account, so data the victim subsequently enters is written to records the attacker controls. The victim is given no indication their identity changed.

Workarounds

Set require_token_presence_for_authentication? true on the authenticated resource's token configuration. store_in_session/2 then writes the key the guard reads, so the already-signed-in branch fires and the remember-me sign-in no longer runs against a live session. Note this changes session storage semantics for the whole application and requires a token resource.

Otherwise remove the remember-me plug from the browser pipeline, which disables remember-me auto-login entirely.

Configurations

The application must enable the remember_me strategy and run its per-request plug in the browser pipeline, with require_token_presence_for_authentication? at its default of false. Enabling that setting makes the guard read the key the session actually holds, which closes the issue.

The attacker also needs a position from which to set a cookie in the victim's browser, such as cookie tossing from a sibling subdomain, an HTTP host without HSTS, or a shared or kiosk browser.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 9.1 / 10 (Critical)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV.


Token revocation record built from unverified JWT claims in AshAuthentication

CVE-2026-78223 / EEF-CVE-2026-78223 / GHSA-mfwg-5cpf-px58

More information

Details

Summary

Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows a caller of the token revocation action to neutralise a revocation or write arbitrary rows into the token resource.

AshAuthentication.TokenResource.RevokeTokenChange.change/3 reads the :token argument and decodes it with AshAuthentication.Jwt.peek/1, which delegates to Joken.peek_claims/1 and performs no signature check, unlike Jwt.verify/4. The jti, exp and sub claims it returns are written straight onto the revocation record, guarded only by byte_size(token) > 0. Because expires_at derives from the attacker-chosen exp, a forged copy of a genuine token that keeps the real jti but backdates exp yields a revocation row that is already expired: expunge_expired removes it and the genuine token passes revoked? again. Arbitrary jti and sub values can be inserted the same way.

This issue affects ash_authentication: from 0.2.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 6.9 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV.


Sign-in token minted for one resource accepted by another in AshAuthentication

CVE-2026-80218 / EEF-CVE-2026-80218 / GHSA-3pr8-f99q-86hp

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Details

Summary

Improper Authentication vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an attacker holding a sign-in token for one authenticated resource to be signed in as a user of a different resource.

AshAuthentication.Strategy.Password.SignInWithTokenPreparation.extract_primary_keys_from_subject/2 parses the JWT sub claim (for example user?id=1) with URI.parse/1 and keeps only its query string, discarding the path segment that names the subject the token was issued for. Nothing else restores that binding: AshAuthentication.Jwt.verify/3 checks the signature, exp, nbf, jti and the library-version claims, the purpose check only requires sign_in, and the remaining comparison is over primary-key field names, which are identical across resources. The WebAuthn sign-in and remember-me preparations carry copies of the same helper and drop the path in the same way. The magic link sign-in path pins the subject name against the resource and is not affected.

This issue affects ash_authentication: from 3.10.5 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 7.6 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV.


Single-use sign-in token placed in a redirect query string in AshAuthenticationPhoenix

CVE-2026-81632 / EEF-CVE-2026-81632 / GHSA-8jh5-339h-mqx9

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Details

Summary

Use of HTTP Request With Sensitive Query String vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthenticationPhoenix allows someone able to read access logs, proxy logs or browser history to recover a single-use sign-in token and authenticate as its owner.

After a successful password sign-in, AshAuthentication.Phoenix.Components.Password.SignInForm builds the sign_in_with_token path with the freshly issued user.__metadata__.token as a query parameter and redirects the browser to it with a GET. The token therefore travels in the request line, where web servers, reverse proxies, request telemetry and the browser's own history record it, all of which outlive the request and are ordinarily less protected than session storage. The redirect destination is restricted to a local path, so this is not an open redirect; the exposure is the retention of a live credential.

This issue affects ash_authentication_phoenix: from 1.7.0 before 2.17.4 and from 3.0.0-rc.0 before 3.0.0-rc.11; ash_authentication: from 3.10.5 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 7.2 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV.


Replayable OAuth2 CSRF state retained after a failed callback in AshAuthentication

CVE-2026-81637 / EEF-CVE-2026-81637 / GHSA-3vcj-gxx8-3p44

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Details

Summary

Insufficient Session Expiration vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an attacker who obtains a victim's OAuth2 state value to replay the callback and sign that victim into an attacker-controlled account.

AshAuthentication.Strategy.OAuth2.Plug.callback/2 clears the stored session_params through a rebinding step inside its with chain, conn <- delete_session(conn, session_key). Elixir evaluates the else block in the scope enclosing the with, so every failure path (the provider returning ?error=access_denied, an invalid code, a token-exchange error, or a registration or sign-in failure) reaches store_authentication_result/2 holding the original connection and the session entry is never removed. The value the module's own comment describes as protection against a CSRF-related attack is therefore consumed only when authentication succeeds, and survives a cancelled or failed attempt until the next request phase or session expiry.

This issue affects ash_authentication: from 0.6.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 2.3 / 10 (Low)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV.


Confirmation token accepted on any record in AshAuthentication

CVE-2026-82685 / EEF-CVE-2026-82685 / GHSA-g636-26vf-2w63

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Details

Summary

Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an authenticated attacker to overwrite and confirm another user's email address, and so take over that account. A confirmation token issued to one user is accepted on any other user's record.

AshAuthentication.AddOn.Confirmation.ConfirmChange verifies the token's signature and its act claim, then applies the changes stored against that token to whichever record the changeset targets, never comparing the sub claim against changeset.data. An attacker who registers an account and changes their own email replays the resulting token against a victim's record id, writing in their own address with force_change_attributes/2 and stamping confirmed_at, after which an ordinary password reset yields the account. The library's own confirmation flow is unaffected, because AshAuthentication.AddOn.Confirmation.Actions.confirm/3 resolves sub to a user and targets that record.

This issue affects ash_authentication: from 0.5.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 7.6 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV.


Actor record with password digest stored in AshAuthentication audit log entries

CVE-2026-82723 / EEF-CVE-2026-82723 / GHSA-59wx-q3r8-ghv4

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Details

Summary

Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows disclosure of user password digests to readers of the audit store.

The audit_log add-on builds each entry's extra_data in AshAuthentication.AddOn.AuditLog.Auditor.build_extra_data/4, which takes :actor from the action callback context verbatim. Any audited action invoked with actor: set to a user record therefore deposits that record, including its hashed_password attribute, into the audit entry. The same module already collapses the audited identity to an opaque string via AshAuthentication.user_to_subject/1 and filters params against the strategy's configured allow-list, so the actor is the only stored value that reaches the audit store unfiltered. Marking the attribute sensitive?: true does not help, because that redacts inspect/1 output rather than JSON encoding or raw-term storage.

There is no attacker-controlled trigger and no network disclosure path: entries accumulate from ordinary authenticated activity, and an attacker's own requests deposit only their own digest. Exploitation requires independent read access to the audit store, such as database credentials, an audit role, a backup, or a log shipper, at which point the digests support offline password attack against every active account. Whether the material persists depends on the data layer, since raw-term stores keep it verbatim while a SQL store raises Protocol.UndefinedError and drops the entry unless the user resource derives Jason.Encoder.

This issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.12.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.2.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 1.8 / 10 (Low)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV.


Reversible IP address pseudonymisation in AshAuthentication audit log hash mode

CVE-2026-82759 / EEF-CVE-2026-82759 / GHSA-cgqj-pcpq-xhfm

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Details

Summary

Use of a One-Way Hash with a Predictable Salt vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows readers of the audit store to recover the client IP addresses that the audit log add-on's :hash privacy mode is meant to pseudonymise.

AshAuthentication.AddOn.AuditLog.IpPrivacy.hash_ip/1 computes a single unkeyed :crypto.hash(:sha256, salt <> ip) and truncates the result to 16 hexadecimal characters. The salt is read from the :audit_log_ip_salt or :secret application config keys, and falls back to the constant "default-salt-change-in-production" published in the library source when neither is set, with nothing warning that the default is in use. The IPv4 space is only 2^32 values and SHA-256 is fast, so the whole hash table is precomputable and every stored value maps back to its source address. Truncating to 16 characters does not help, and even a configured salt leaves the hash cheap enough to enumerate once it leaks.

This issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.12.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.

Configurations

Only applications that enable the audit_log add-on and set its ip_privacy mode to :hash store the affected value. Other modes (:none, :truncate, :exclude) do not reach hash_ip/1.

The complete break additionally requires the default salt, that is neither :audit_log_ip_salt nor :secret configured under the :ash_authentication application. This is the out-of-the-box state: no warning or error is raised when the hardcoded salt is in use.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 1.8 / 10 (Low)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV.


Superlinear base62 decoding exhausts CPU and memory in AshAuthentication API key sign-in

CVE-2026-82760 / EEF-CVE-2026-82760 / GHSA-q876-xr24-2mcx

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Details

Summary

Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an unauthenticated attacker to exhaust CPU and memory via an oversized base62 segment in a submitted API key.

AshAuthentication.Base.decode62/1 in lib/ash_authentication/base.ex splits its argument into one binary per character and folds it with charval62/2, which recomputes Integer.pow(62, index) at every position instead of accumulating by Horner's method, so cost grows roughly cubically in the input length. bindecode62/1 in the same module is quadratic through Integer.undigits/2 and Integer.digits/2. Neither function caps byte_size/1, and AshAuthentication.Strategy.ApiKey.SignInPreparation passes the underscore-separated segments of the submitted key straight into both, before any key lookup and without prior authentication. The surrounding rescue clauses catch exceptions, not CPU or memory exhaustion.

This issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.8.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 8.2 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV.


CVE-2026-82761 / EEF-CVE-2026-82761 / GHSA-23gr-vcp4-r27q

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Details

Summary

Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an attacker holding a leaked magic link to replay its single-use token and authenticate as the target subject. A magic link configured with single_use_token?, which is the default, is meant to be redeemable exactly once, but nothing serialises the token's validity check against its consumption, so concurrent redemptions of one token all succeed and each yields a full user token.

Sign-in verifies the JWT with Jwt.verify/4 and revokes it only afterwards: AshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.SignInPreparation revokes in a Query.after_action callback, and AshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.SignInChange in an after_transaction hook that runs once the sign-in has already committed. AshAuthentication.TokenResource.Actions.revoke/3 writes the revocation as an upsert, so a concurrent duplicate revocation silently succeeds instead of conflicting and no request ever loses the race.

This issue affects ash_authentication: from 3.9.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 9.1 / 10 (Critical)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV.


require_confirmed_with is not enforced on the action and fails open on an unreadable attribute in AshAuthentication

CVE-2026-85500 / EEF-CVE-2026-85500 / GHSA-fc47-6pgw-wh22

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Details

Summary

Authentication Bypass by Primary Weakness vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an unconfirmed user to obtain a session, defeating a mandatory email confirmation requirement.

AshAuthentication.Strategy.Password.Actions.check_user/2 decides whether the attribute named by require_confirmed_with is set using a bare is_nil(Map.get(user, value)). When that attribute is not selected on the loaded record Map.get/2 returns %Ash.NotLoaded{}, and when a field policy denies it for the current actor it returns %Ash.ForbiddenField{}. Neither is nil, so the rejection branch is skipped and sign-i

require_confirmed_with is enforced in two places, and neither holds in every
configuration. sign_in_with_token and register are checked only inside
AshAuthentication.Strategy.Password.Actions, not on the action itself, so any caller
that invokes the action directly skips the check. An API layer such as AshGraphql or
AshJsonApi invokes the action directly, so this applies to the default configuration.
Where a check does run it compares the confirmation attribute against nil. That
attribute holds %Ash.NotLoaded{} or %Ash.ForbiddenField{} when it sets
select_by_default?: false, when an API layer narrows the read's select, or when a
field policy hides it from the sign-in actor. Neither struct is nil, so those
configurations read every user as confirmed.

This issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.3.8 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 9.1 / 10 (Critical)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV.


Log injection via an unescaped password reset identity in AshAuthentication

CVE-2026-86522 / EEF-CVE-2026-86522 / GHSA-wg7g-r393-vr3g

More information

Details

Summary

Improper Output Neutralization for Logs vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an unauthenticated attacker to forge application log entries by submitting a password reset identity containing newlines or control characters.

AshAuthentication.Strategy.Password.RequestPasswordReset.run/3 interpolates the identity argument, the email or username taken straight from the reset request, into its Logger.warning/1 heredocs without escaping, truncating or type-restricting it. The resource logged beside it is passed through inspect/1, which would have neutralized the value. A newline in the identity therefore ends the log record, and everything after it is written as a line of its own, so an attacker chooses the severity tag and the content of entries that appear to have come from the application.

This issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.2.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 6.3 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV.


Revoked session accepted because the session jti is never checked in AshAuthentication and AshAuthentication Phoenix

CVE-2026-86533 / EEF-CVE-2026-86533 / GHSA-m6x4-4gvp-xwjr

More information

Details

Summary

Insufficient Session Expiration vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication and AshAuthentication Phoenix allows a revoked session to remain fully authenticated.

A resource configured with session_identifier :jti and require_token_presence_for_authentication? disabled stores its session value as <jti>:<subject>. The jti is there so that signing out can revoke that one session. Neither reader consults it: AshAuthentication.Plug.Helpers.authenticate_resource_from_session/4 and AshAuthentication.Phoenix.LiveSession.on_mount/4 both split the value with split_identifier/2, discard the jti and pass the bare subject to AshAuthentication.subject_to_user/3, which reloads the record. The token-presence branch of each function does check its token, calling AshAuthentication.TokenResource.Actions.get_token/3 with the jti and the purpose user. Because the revocation record is never read, neither its revoked state nor its expiry constrains the session, so a session captured before sign-out keeps working.

This issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.9.1 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14; ash_authentication_phoenix: from 2.10.0 before 2.17.4 and from 3.0.0-rc.0 before 3.0.0-rc.11.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 9.1 / 10 (Critical)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV.


Session id is not renewed on authentication in ash_authentication, allowing session fixation

CVE-2026-86688 / EEF-CVE-2026-86688 / GHSA-v577-944g-7h3x

More information

Details

Summary

Session Fixation vulnerability in team-alembic ash_authentication allows an attacker who can plant a session identifier in a victim's browser to hold an authenticated session once that victim signs in.

AshAuthentication.Plug.Helpers.store_in_session/2 writes the authenticated subject into the existing session with Plug.Conn.put_session/3 and never calls Plug.Conn.configure_session(renew: true), so the identifier the visitor arrived with carries into their authenticated session. Every authentication event reaches this one function: the default success/4 injected by AshAuthentication.Phoenix.Controller.__using__/1, the AuthController emitted by mix ash_authentication_phoenix.install, and remember-me auto-login. AshAuthentication.Phoenix.Plug.store_in_session/2 is a defdelegate to it. Logout does not close the window either, because clear_session/2 ends with Plug.Conn.clear_session/1, which clears session contents but leaves the identifier intact, so a planted identifier survives a logout-then-login cycle.

This issue affects ash_authentication: from 0.2.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.

Impact

An attacker holding a session identifier they planted before the victim signed in gains that victim's authenticated session, and with it full account takeover, in deployments using a server-side session store.

Workarounds

Call Plug.Conn.configure_session(conn, renew: true) in your own success/4 before store_in_session/2. This is a one-line change in application code and closes the controller sign-in path, though not remember-me auto-login, which does not pass through application code.

Add Plug.Conn.configure_session(conn, drop: true) at sign-out so a planted identifier does not survive a logout-then-login cycle.

Configurations

Exploitation for account takeover requires a server-side session store (ETS, Mnesia, Redis or a database), where the cookie carries a stable session identifier, and a position from which the attacker can plant that cookie in the victim's browser: cookie tossing from a sibling subdomain, an HTTP host without HSTS, or a shared or kiosk browser.

Phoenix defaults to the signed cookie store, and neither package's installer changes it. Under that store the authenticated session lives in the re-signed cookie delivered only to the victim, so a planted pre-authentication copy does not become an authenticated session. Attacker-planted session contents, such as a return_to value, still survive into the authenticated session there.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 7.4 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV.


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This PR contains the following updates: | Package | Type | Update | Change | |---|---|---|---| | [ash_authentication](https://hex.pm/packages/ash_authentication) | prod | minor | `~> 4.13.0` → `~> 4.15.0` | --- ### OAuth2/OIDC account takeover in AshAuthentication via email-based user matching [CVE-2026-49757](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-49757) / EEF-CVE-2026-49757 / [GHSA-777c-2fxx-qr28](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-777c-2fxx-qr28) <details> <summary>More information</summary> #### Details ##### Summary Authentication Bypass by Spoofing vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows account takeover of local users via OAuth2/OIDC sign-in. AshAuthentication's OAuth2 and OIDC family strategies matched the local user by email address (an upsert on the email field, or a user-defined sign-in filter) rather than by the OpenID Connect iss/sub claim combination. Per OpenID Connect Core §5.7, only iss/sub uniquely and stably identifies an end-user; other claims, including email, MUST NOT be used as unique identifiers. A provider login presenting a victim's email, including an unverified email, a reused email, or an account with email\_verified: false, resolved to and signed in as the victim's existing local account. An unauthenticated attacker who can register an account on any accepted OAuth provider with the victim's email (or who benefits from provider-side email reuse or reclamation) obtains the victim's full local privileges. The fix resolves users by the (strategy, sub) identity stored in a user identity resource, and only links a new sub to an existing local account by email when the provider's email\_verified claim is trusted (trust\_email\_verified?). This issue affects ash\_authentication from 0.1.0 before 4.14.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.10. #### Severity - CVSS Score: 9.2 / 10 (Critical) - Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N` #### References - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-777c-2fxx-qr28](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-777c-2fxx-qr28) - [https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-49757.html](https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-49757.html) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/728b8d28c1b5f465fa1116ef044a815300fc733d](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/728b8d28c1b5f465fa1116ef044a815300fc733d) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/64530644f9b37ebb76ca14aeb83a77597a0034b7](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/64530644f9b37ebb76ca14aeb83a77597a0034b7) - [https://hex.pm/packages/ash_authentication](https://hex.pm/packages/ash_authentication) This data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-49757). </details> --- ### AshAuthentication vulnerable to OAuth2/OIDC account takeover via email-based user matching [CVE-2026-49757](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-49757) / EEF-CVE-2026-49757 / [GHSA-777c-2fxx-qr28](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-777c-2fxx-qr28) <details> <summary>More information</summary> #### Details ##### Summary AshAuthentication's OAuth2 and OIDC family strategies matched the local user by email address rather than by the OpenID Connect `iss`/`sub` claim combination. A provider login presenting a victim's email (including an unverified, reused, or `email_verified: false` account) resolved to and signed in as the victim's existing local account. An unauthenticated attacker who can register an account on any accepted OAuth provider with the victim's email obtains the victim's full local privileges. ##### Details Per OpenID Connect Core §5.7, only the `iss`/`sub` claim combination uniquely and stably identifies an end-user; any other claim, including `email`, MUST NOT be used as a unique identifier. AshAuthentication's OAuth2/OIDC register flow nonetheless drove the upsert by the email field (`upsert_identity` on email, or a user-defined sign-in filter), and the sign-in preparation filtered users by email. **1. Provider login.** The attacker signs in to a configured OAuth/OIDC provider with the victim's email. This is trivial for providers that don't verify email ownership, and possible under email-reuse / reclamation for providers that do. **2. AshAuthentication register step.** `'Elixir.AshAuthentication.Strategy.OAuth2.IdentityChange':change/3` invokes the upsert action whose `upsert_identity` resolves on the email. The action lands on the victim's existing record. **3. Sign-in preparation.** `'Elixir.AshAuthentication.Strategy.OAuth2.SignInPreparation':prepare/3` does not verify the returned user against an `iss`/`sub` identity, so the attacker is authenticated as the victim. ##### Configurations Exploitation requires one of: * The configured OAuth/OIDC provider does not reliably verify email ownership (lets a user register with any email, or fails to verify it). Many social/enterprise providers fall into this category, including Slack, generic OIDC deployments, and any custom OAuth2 endpoint without strict email validation. * The provider allows email reclamation: the victim's email becomes available on the provider (account deletion, organisation off-boarding, mail-host change) and the attacker registers it. The attacker then signs in via that provider and takes over the local account. Providers that strictly verify email ownership and forbid reuse (e.g. modern Google Workspace, GitHub for accounts that have completed verification) are not directly exploitable, but applications that accept any of the affected strategy types in addition are still exposed via the weaker providers in the set. ##### PoC 1. On any accepted OAuth/OIDC provider, register an account whose email is the victim's email (or use a provider that allows email reuse). 2. Complete the standard OAuth flow against the AshAuthentication application. 3. The application's upsert resolves on email, signs the attacker in as the victim, and returns a session token for the victim's account. ##### Impact Unauthenticated remote account takeover against any AshAuthentication-using application that exposes an OAuth2/OIDC strategy. The default configuration of every affected strategy is vulnerable; no application-level misconfiguration is required. An attacker who succeeds gains the victim's full local identity, with read, write, and destructive access to whatever the victim's account can do. ##### References * Introduction commit: https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/c5f589058e04239263f50a1430eb17ea6d5dd1a2 * Patch commit (4.x backport): https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/728b8d28c1b5f465fa1116ef044a815300fc733d * Patch commit (5.x): https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/64530644f9b37ebb76ca14aeb83a77597a0034b7 #### Severity - CVSS Score: 9.2 / 10 (Critical) - Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N` #### References - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-777c-2fxx-qr28](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-777c-2fxx-qr28) - [https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-49757](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-49757) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/64530644f9b37ebb76ca14aeb83a77597a0034b7](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/64530644f9b37ebb76ca14aeb83a77597a0034b7) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/728b8d28c1b5f465fa1116ef044a815300fc733d](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/728b8d28c1b5f465fa1116ef044a815300fc733d) - [https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-49757.html](https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-49757.html) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/releases/tag/v4.14.0](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/releases/tag/v4.14.0) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/releases/tag/v5.0.0-rc.10](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/releases/tag/v5.0.0-rc.10) - [https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-49757](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-49757) This data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-777c-2fxx-qr28) and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://github.com/github/advisory-database) ([CC-BY 4.0](https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)). </details> --- ### Purpose-limited JWT accepted as full bearer authentication in AshAuthentication [CVE-2026-65633](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-65633) / EEF-CVE-2026-65633 / [GHSA-6vcj-3h59-rrc3](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6vcj-3h59-rrc3) <details> <summary>More information</summary> #### Details ##### Summary Improper Authentication vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows purpose-limited JWTs to be replayed as full bearer API credentials when a resource uses stateless bearer-token verification. The bearer-token authentication helper `AshAuthentication.Plug.Helpers.retrieve_from_bearer/3` verifies an `Authorization: Bearer` JWT's signature and rejects tokens containing an `act` claim, but performs no check that the token's `purpose` claim equals `user` at the bearer boundary. When the resource is configured with `require_token_presence_for_authentication?: false` (the DSL default), the follow-on `validate_token/3` helper returns `{:ok, nil}` without consulting the token resource, so no downstream check on `purpose` takes place either. As a result, any valid, non-expired JWT the library itself issued for a narrow, single-purpose flow (most notably the `purpose: sign_in` token that WebAuthn always emits during sign-in, and that the Password strategy emits when sign-in tokens are enabled) is accepted directly as a general-purpose bearer credential and resolves to a full `current_user` assignment. This bypasses the library's intended token-exchange contract, in which the `sign_in` token is meant to be presented exactly once to a preparation that validates the `purpose` claim and immediately revokes the token. The first use of a still-valid sign-in token presented directly in the `Authorization` header succeeds because the stateless bearer path never scopes it to `purpose == "user"`. An attacker who obtains a not-yet-exchanged sign-in token for a target subject (for example via log or referrer leakage, an intercepted magic-link delivery channel, or a partially compromised intermediary) can present it as a bearer token and be authenticated as that subject, fully bypassing the intended one-time-use and revocation semantics. Exploitation additionally requires that the host application wire up `retrieve_from_bearer/3` on a reachable route and uses either WebAuthn (sign-in tokens are always issued) or the Password strategy with `sign_in_tokens_enabled?: true`. Resources configured with `require_token_presence_for_authentication?: true` (including applications scaffolded by the Igniter installer since v4.5.0) and the session-based path (`authenticate_resource_from_session/4`) enforce `purpose == "user"` against the stored token record and are not affected. This issue affects ash_authentication: from 3.10.5 before 4.14.2 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.13. ##### Configurations The bypass is reachable only when a resource uses stateless bearer-token verification, i.e. `require_token_presence_for_authentication?` is `false` (the DSL default). In that mode `validate_token/3` returns `{:ok, nil}` without consulting the token resource, so the JWT's `purpose` claim is the only remaining scoping signal at the bearer boundary and it is never checked. When `require_token_presence_for_authentication?` is `true`, `validate_token/3` looks the token up with `get_token(%{"jti" => jti, "purpose" => "user"})`; purpose-limited tokens are stored under their own purpose (`sign_in`, `remember_me`, ...), so that lookup fails and those tokens are rejected. Applications scaffolded by the Igniter installer since v4.5.0 default to `require_token_presence_for_authentication?: true` and are therefore not exposed as generated; applications configured manually or that deliberately opt into stateless JWT verification are. Exploitation additionally requires the host application to wire up `AshAuthentication.Plug.Helpers.retrieve_from_bearer/3` on a route the attacker can reach, and to use a strategy that issues purpose-limited JWTs carrying a resolvable `sub` claim: either the WebAuthn strategy (sign-in tokens are always emitted, no opt-in required) or the Password strategy with `sign_in_tokens_enabled?: true`. The session-based path (`authenticate_resource_from_session/4`) already enforces `purpose == "user"` against the token resource and is not affected. #### Severity - CVSS Score: 7.6 / 10 (High) - Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N` #### References - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-6vcj-3h59-rrc3](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-6vcj-3h59-rrc3) - [https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-65633.html](https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-65633.html) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/8cf8b2d4426172be0900a3505e9491800b951750](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/8cf8b2d4426172be0900a3505e9491800b951750) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/124eddd1bbeb40289c3fe8831ac10677a19fcf09](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/124eddd1bbeb40289c3fe8831ac10677a19fcf09) - [https://hex.pm/packages/ash_authentication](https://hex.pm/packages/ash_authentication) This data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-65633). </details> --- ### Reflected XSS in AshAuthentication confirmation and magic link interaction forms [CVE-2026-66882](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-66882) / EEF-CVE-2026-66882 / [GHSA-54fc-x3hv-ffhw](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-54fc-x3hv-ffhw) <details> <summary>More information</summary> #### Details ##### Summary Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS) vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows reflected cross-site scripting via the confirmation and magic link interaction forms. When a strategy is configured with `require_interaction?` set to `true`, AshAuthentication serves an intermediate HTML page asking the user to confirm the action by submitting a form. Both such pages embed a request parameter directly into a hidden input's `value` attribute without HTML escaping: `lib/ash_authentication/add_ons/confirmation/confirmation_form.html.eex` interpolates the `confirm` parameter, and `lib/ash_authentication/strategies/magic_link/sign_in_form.html.eex` interpolates the magic link token parameter. These templates are compiled with `EEx.function_from_file/3` using plain `<%= %>` expressions, which perform no escaping, so the parameter is reflected verbatim. Neither accept handler validates the value before rendering it. `AshAuthentication.AddOn.Confirmation.Plug.accept/2` only checks that a `confirm` key is present, and `AshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.Plug.accept/2` reads the parameter directly, so no token signature is verified at this stage and arbitrary attacker-supplied text reaches the template. An unauthenticated attacker can therefore craft a URL whose parameter terminates the attribute and injects markup, for example a quote followed by a `<script>` element. Because the accept phase is served over GET, loading the crafted link is sufficient; no form submission or prior authentication is required. The injected script executes in the origin of the application embedding AshAuthentication, giving it access to that origin's cookies, session, and same-origin responses. Since these pages are part of the authentication flow, a victim following what appears to be a legitimate confirmation or sign-in link is a plausible target. This issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.8.0 before 4.14.2 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.13. ##### Configurations Only strategies configured with `require_interaction?` set to `true` are affected. This option defaults to `false`, and when it is disabled the vulnerable accept route is not registered at all, so the affected pages cannot be reached. The option is not obscure: AshAuthentication's own documentation for the confirmation add-on advises that applications using AshAuthenticationPhoenix should enable it, so the affected configuration is a documented and recommended deployment rather than an unusual one. At least one of the following must be configured with `require_interaction? true`: - the `confirmation` add-on, which serves the affected confirmation accept form; or - the `magic_link` strategy, which serves the affected sign-in accept form. #### Severity - CVSS Score: 2.1 / 10 (Low) - Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N` #### References - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-54fc-x3hv-ffhw](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-54fc-x3hv-ffhw) - [https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-66882.html](https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-66882.html) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/62719710790a150a9eacab9c0a066e0d122d15be](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/62719710790a150a9eacab9c0a066e0d122d15be) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/0bd5199db066be22b2ca1ec8bc6109e5d62e6070](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/0bd5199db066be22b2ca1ec8bc6109e5d62e6070) - [https://hex.pm/packages/ash_authentication](https://hex.pm/packages/ash_authentication) This data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-66882). </details> --- ### Remember-me sign-in guard reads a session key that is never written in ash_authentication, allowing session replacement [CVE-2026-76949](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76949) / EEF-CVE-2026-76949 / [GHSA-hh34-374j-pfr5](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hh34-374j-pfr5) <details> <summary>More information</summary> #### Details ##### Summary Authentication Bypass by Spoofing vulnerability in team-alembic ash_authentication allows an attacker who can plant a remember-me cookie in a victim's browser to replace that victim's authenticated session with one for the attacker's own account. `AshAuthentication.Plug.Helpers.sign_in_using_remember_me/3` skips re-authenticating an already-signed-in visitor by checking the session for `"<subject_name>_token"`, but `store_in_session/2` writes that key only when `require_token_presence_for_authentication?` is enabled and otherwise writes the bare subject name. At the default setting the guard therefore reads a key that is never written, its already-signed-in branch is unreachable, and the remember-me sign-in runs on every request through the per-request browser pipeline plug. A planted remember-me cookie is consequently honoured even for a visitor holding a live authenticated session, so whatever the victim enters afterwards lands in data the attacker controls. The read path in `authenticate_resource_from_session/4` selects the key correctly, so the guard and the reader disagree about which key holds the session. This issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.10.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14. ##### Impact An attacker who can set a remember-me cookie in a victim's browser silently replaces the victim's authenticated session with one for the attacker's own account, so data the victim subsequently enters is written to records the attacker controls. The victim is given no indication their identity changed. ##### Workarounds Set `require_token_presence_for_authentication? true` on the authenticated resource's token configuration. `store_in_session/2` then writes the key the guard reads, so the already-signed-in branch fires and the remember-me sign-in no longer runs against a live session. Note this changes session storage semantics for the whole application and requires a token resource. Otherwise remove the remember-me plug from the browser pipeline, which disables remember-me auto-login entirely. ##### Configurations The application must enable the `remember_me` strategy and run its per-request plug in the browser pipeline, with `require_token_presence_for_authentication?` at its default of `false`. Enabling that setting makes the guard read the key the session actually holds, which closes the issue. The attacker also needs a position from which to set a cookie in the victim's browser, such as cookie tossing from a sibling subdomain, an HTTP host without HSTS, or a shared or kiosk browser. #### Severity - CVSS Score: 9.1 / 10 (Critical) - Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N` #### References - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-hh34-374j-pfr5](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-hh34-374j-pfr5) - [https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-76949.html](https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-76949.html) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/3d3de314692558d06ec13945f857f00514e95a8c](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/3d3de314692558d06ec13945f857f00514e95a8c) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/b9568a53b438247238b1c5a4f49c8d84650f4bba](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/b9568a53b438247238b1c5a4f49c8d84650f4bba) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/9a34136b844abe179da1075067cf2835c64dcc12](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/9a34136b844abe179da1075067cf2835c64dcc12) - [https://hex.pm/packages/ash_authentication](https://hex.pm/packages/ash_authentication) This data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-76949). </details> --- ### Token revocation record built from unverified JWT claims in AshAuthentication [CVE-2026-78223](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-78223) / EEF-CVE-2026-78223 / [GHSA-mfwg-5cpf-px58](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mfwg-5cpf-px58) <details> <summary>More information</summary> #### Details ##### Summary Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows a caller of the token revocation action to neutralise a revocation or write arbitrary rows into the token resource. `AshAuthentication.TokenResource.RevokeTokenChange.change/3` reads the `:token` argument and decodes it with `AshAuthentication.Jwt.peek/1`, which delegates to `Joken.peek_claims/1` and performs no signature check, unlike `Jwt.verify/4`. The `jti`, `exp` and `sub` claims it returns are written straight onto the revocation record, guarded only by `byte_size(token) > 0`. Because `expires_at` derives from the attacker-chosen `exp`, a forged copy of a genuine token that keeps the real `jti` but backdates `exp` yields a revocation row that is already expired: `expunge_expired` removes it and the genuine token passes `revoked?` again. Arbitrary `jti` and `sub` values can be inserted the same way. This issue affects ash_authentication: from 0.2.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14. #### Severity - CVSS Score: 6.9 / 10 (Medium) - Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N` #### References - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-mfwg-5cpf-px58](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-mfwg-5cpf-px58) - [https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-78223.html](https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-78223.html) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/a939dde9b917c072cdf10c4b0913a9886a4b0231](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/a939dde9b917c072cdf10c4b0913a9886a4b0231) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/344cebb12faf68e648d3283394073ba0c0f78459](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/344cebb12faf68e648d3283394073ba0c0f78459) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/eb86353fe5a547c5ff5fd9af0e2c212518c31c9b](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/eb86353fe5a547c5ff5fd9af0e2c212518c31c9b) - [https://hex.pm/packages/ash_authentication](https://hex.pm/packages/ash_authentication) This data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-78223). </details> --- ### Sign-in token minted for one resource accepted by another in AshAuthentication [CVE-2026-80218](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80218) / EEF-CVE-2026-80218 / [GHSA-3pr8-f99q-86hp](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-3pr8-f99q-86hp) <details> <summary>More information</summary> #### Details ##### Summary Improper Authentication vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an attacker holding a sign-in token for one authenticated resource to be signed in as a user of a different resource. `AshAuthentication.Strategy.Password.SignInWithTokenPreparation.extract_primary_keys_from_subject/2` parses the JWT `sub` claim (for example `user?id=1`) with `URI.parse/1` and keeps only its query string, discarding the path segment that names the subject the token was issued for. Nothing else restores that binding: `AshAuthentication.Jwt.verify/3` checks the signature, `exp`, `nbf`, `jti` and the library-version claims, the purpose check only requires `sign_in`, and the remaining comparison is over primary-key field names, which are identical across resources. The WebAuthn sign-in and remember-me preparations carry copies of the same helper and drop the path in the same way. The magic link sign-in path pins the subject name against the resource and is not affected. This issue affects ash_authentication: from 3.10.5 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14. #### Severity - CVSS Score: 7.6 / 10 (High) - Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N` #### References - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-3pr8-f99q-86hp](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-3pr8-f99q-86hp) - [https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-80218.html](https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-80218.html) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/eca8cadea0f1595ed2c10a0c177b1da9aa9e5269](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/eca8cadea0f1595ed2c10a0c177b1da9aa9e5269) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/2640e1872e1fef4e4606e601bf00102cff784c03](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/2640e1872e1fef4e4606e601bf00102cff784c03) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/7baac243ca651eee127a84d672eee3fcff42e598](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/7baac243ca651eee127a84d672eee3fcff42e598) - [https://hex.pm/packages/ash_authentication](https://hex.pm/packages/ash_authentication) This data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-80218). </details> --- ### Single-use sign-in token placed in a redirect query string in AshAuthenticationPhoenix [CVE-2026-81632](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-81632) / EEF-CVE-2026-81632 / [GHSA-8jh5-339h-mqx9](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8jh5-339h-mqx9) <details> <summary>More information</summary> #### Details ##### Summary Use of HTTP Request With Sensitive Query String vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthenticationPhoenix allows someone able to read access logs, proxy logs or browser history to recover a single-use sign-in token and authenticate as its owner. After a successful password sign-in, `AshAuthentication.Phoenix.Components.Password.SignInForm` builds the `sign_in_with_token` path with the freshly issued `user.__metadata__.token` as a query parameter and redirects the browser to it with a GET. The token therefore travels in the request line, where web servers, reverse proxies, request telemetry and the browser's own history record it, all of which outlive the request and are ordinarily less protected than session storage. The redirect destination is restricted to a local path, so this is not an open redirect; the exposure is the retention of a live credential. This issue affects ash_authentication_phoenix: from 1.7.0 before 2.17.4 and from 3.0.0-rc.0 before 3.0.0-rc.11; ash_authentication: from 3.10.5 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14. #### Severity - CVSS Score: 7.2 / 10 (High) - Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N` #### References - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication_phoenix/security/advisories/GHSA-8jh5-339h-mqx9](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication_phoenix/security/advisories/GHSA-8jh5-339h-mqx9) - [https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-81632.html](https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-81632.html) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-j726-59hm-r46r](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-j726-59hm-r46r) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication_phoenix/commit/903f3a386e1aba2f7b070187ef6f31215a92bdfd](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication_phoenix/commit/903f3a386e1aba2f7b070187ef6f31215a92bdfd) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication_phoenix/commit/920257d0460b9c7cbb42a83d0888c10f4eeeb88a](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication_phoenix/commit/920257d0460b9c7cbb42a83d0888c10f4eeeb88a) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication_phoenix/commit/ff5ad8737748afed9cdfde3ec3a05b8a4702a742](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication_phoenix/commit/ff5ad8737748afed9cdfde3ec3a05b8a4702a742) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/eca8cadea0f1595ed2c10a0c177b1da9aa9e5269](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/eca8cadea0f1595ed2c10a0c177b1da9aa9e5269) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/bbf345c1bb7aa28bce5dd856ac0ed2427f103859](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/bbf345c1bb7aa28bce5dd856ac0ed2427f103859) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/8d8ddd25c69b669a92a701af74bff42e1aada998](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/8d8ddd25c69b669a92a701af74bff42e1aada998) - [https://hex.pm/packages/ash_authentication_phoenix](https://hex.pm/packages/ash_authentication_phoenix) - [https://hex.pm/packages/ash_authentication](https://hex.pm/packages/ash_authentication) This data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-81632). </details> --- ### Replayable OAuth2 CSRF state retained after a failed callback in AshAuthentication [CVE-2026-81637](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-81637) / EEF-CVE-2026-81637 / [GHSA-3vcj-gxx8-3p44](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-3vcj-gxx8-3p44) <details> <summary>More information</summary> #### Details ##### Summary Insufficient Session Expiration vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an attacker who obtains a victim's OAuth2 `state` value to replay the callback and sign that victim into an attacker-controlled account. `AshAuthentication.Strategy.OAuth2.Plug.callback/2` clears the stored `session_params` through a rebinding step inside its `with` chain, `conn <- delete_session(conn, session_key)`. Elixir evaluates the `else` block in the scope enclosing the `with`, so every failure path (the provider returning `?error=access_denied`, an invalid code, a token-exchange error, or a registration or sign-in failure) reaches `store_authentication_result/2` holding the original connection and the session entry is never removed. The value the module's own comment describes as protection against a CSRF-related attack is therefore consumed only when authentication succeeds, and survives a cancelled or failed attempt until the next request phase or session expiry. This issue affects ash_authentication: from 0.6.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14. #### Severity - CVSS Score: 2.3 / 10 (Low) - Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N` #### References - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-3vcj-gxx8-3p44](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-3vcj-gxx8-3p44) - [https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-81637.html](https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-81637.html) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/c5f589058e04239263f50a1430eb17ea6d5dd1a2](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/c5f589058e04239263f50a1430eb17ea6d5dd1a2) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/bd4352303bc9d72d007f6818775267585a4bcc2f](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/bd4352303bc9d72d007f6818775267585a4bcc2f) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/d7f939cd02bd618bcaa304631846fa75ffc419d7](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/d7f939cd02bd618bcaa304631846fa75ffc419d7) - [https://hex.pm/packages/ash_authentication](https://hex.pm/packages/ash_authentication) This data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-81637). </details> --- ### Confirmation token accepted on any record in AshAuthentication [CVE-2026-82685](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82685) / EEF-CVE-2026-82685 / [GHSA-g636-26vf-2w63](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g636-26vf-2w63) <details> <summary>More information</summary> #### Details ##### Summary Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an authenticated attacker to overwrite and confirm another user's email address, and so take over that account. A confirmation token issued to one user is accepted on any other user's record. `AshAuthentication.AddOn.Confirmation.ConfirmChange` verifies the token's signature and its `act` claim, then applies the changes stored against that token to whichever record the changeset targets, never comparing the `sub` claim against `changeset.data`. An attacker who registers an account and changes their own email replays the resulting token against a victim's record id, writing in their own address with `force_change_attributes/2` and stamping `confirmed_at`, after which an ordinary password reset yields the account. The library's own confirmation flow is unaffected, because `AshAuthentication.AddOn.Confirmation.Actions.confirm/3` resolves `sub` to a user and targets that record. This issue affects ash_authentication: from 0.5.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14. #### Severity - CVSS Score: 7.6 / 10 (High) - Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N` #### References - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-g636-26vf-2w63](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-g636-26vf-2w63) - [https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-82685.html](https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-82685.html) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/1d4bb00617aecae85c33f2ff5bc7e094c6449a6e](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/1d4bb00617aecae85c33f2ff5bc7e094c6449a6e) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/d7c15c21d39c009206e010cd67e2d86370fe7a28](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/d7c15c21d39c009206e010cd67e2d86370fe7a28) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/2a2396af131ab67e2f445b805fecce8e6ca86c0e](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/2a2396af131ab67e2f445b805fecce8e6ca86c0e) - [https://hex.pm/packages/ash_authentication](https://hex.pm/packages/ash_authentication) This data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-82685). </details> --- ### Actor record with password digest stored in AshAuthentication audit log entries [CVE-2026-82723](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82723) / EEF-CVE-2026-82723 / [GHSA-59wx-q3r8-ghv4](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-59wx-q3r8-ghv4) <details> <summary>More information</summary> #### Details ##### Summary Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows disclosure of user password digests to readers of the audit store. The `audit_log` add-on builds each entry's `extra_data` in `AshAuthentication.AddOn.AuditLog.Auditor.build_extra_data/4`, which takes `:actor` from the action callback context verbatim. Any audited action invoked with `actor:` set to a user record therefore deposits that record, including its `hashed_password` attribute, into the audit entry. The same module already collapses the audited identity to an opaque string via `AshAuthentication.user_to_subject/1` and filters `params` against the strategy's configured allow-list, so the actor is the only stored value that reaches the audit store unfiltered. Marking the attribute `sensitive?: true` does not help, because that redacts `inspect/1` output rather than JSON encoding or raw-term storage. There is no attacker-controlled trigger and no network disclosure path: entries accumulate from ordinary authenticated activity, and an attacker's own requests deposit only their own digest. Exploitation requires independent read access to the audit store, such as database credentials, an audit role, a backup, or a log shipper, at which point the digests support offline password attack against every active account. Whether the material persists depends on the data layer, since raw-term stores keep it verbatim while a SQL store raises `Protocol.UndefinedError` and drops the entry unless the user resource derives `Jason.Encoder`. This issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.12.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.2. #### Severity - CVSS Score: 1.8 / 10 (Low) - Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N` #### References - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-59wx-q3r8-ghv4](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-59wx-q3r8-ghv4) - [https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-82723.html](https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-82723.html) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/255cfc9c0e511b7e0de39f8b3d676ae994fae06c](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/255cfc9c0e511b7e0de39f8b3d676ae994fae06c) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/17ea0dff3bad56a7e915e050c43ab7160b37901f](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/17ea0dff3bad56a7e915e050c43ab7160b37901f) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/f6b49cc98b9ff7c16a1aeb12e35633a8d93a211f](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/f6b49cc98b9ff7c16a1aeb12e35633a8d93a211f) - [https://hex.pm/packages/ash_authentication](https://hex.pm/packages/ash_authentication) This data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-82723). </details> --- ### Reversible IP address pseudonymisation in AshAuthentication audit log hash mode [CVE-2026-82759](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82759) / EEF-CVE-2026-82759 / [GHSA-cgqj-pcpq-xhfm](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-cgqj-pcpq-xhfm) <details> <summary>More information</summary> #### Details ##### Summary Use of a One-Way Hash with a Predictable Salt vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows readers of the audit store to recover the client IP addresses that the audit log add-on's `:hash` privacy mode is meant to pseudonymise. `AshAuthentication.AddOn.AuditLog.IpPrivacy.hash_ip/1` computes a single unkeyed `:crypto.hash(:sha256, salt <> ip)` and truncates the result to 16 hexadecimal characters. The salt is read from the `:audit_log_ip_salt` or `:secret` application config keys, and falls back to the constant `"default-salt-change-in-production"` published in the library source when neither is set, with nothing warning that the default is in use. The IPv4 space is only 2^32 values and SHA-256 is fast, so the whole hash table is precomputable and every stored value maps back to its source address. Truncating to 16 characters does not help, and even a configured salt leaves the hash cheap enough to enumerate once it leaks. This issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.12.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14. ##### Configurations Only applications that enable the `audit_log` add-on and set its `ip_privacy` mode to `:hash` store the affected value. Other modes (`:none`, `:truncate`, `:exclude`) do not reach `hash_ip/1`. The complete break additionally requires the default salt, that is neither `:audit_log_ip_salt` nor `:secret` configured under the `:ash_authentication` application. This is the out-of-the-box state: no warning or error is raised when the hardcoded salt is in use. #### Severity - CVSS Score: 1.8 / 10 (Low) - Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N` #### References - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-cgqj-pcpq-xhfm](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-cgqj-pcpq-xhfm) - [https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-82759.html](https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-82759.html) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/255cfc9c0e511b7e0de39f8b3d676ae994fae06c](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/255cfc9c0e511b7e0de39f8b3d676ae994fae06c) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/d8a9c4b6bde828fdc8346198d5e4f588b5937541](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/d8a9c4b6bde828fdc8346198d5e4f588b5937541) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/c3a6d5fe0d4fd383ea81b0402db0a96638479478](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/c3a6d5fe0d4fd383ea81b0402db0a96638479478) - [https://hex.pm/packages/ash_authentication](https://hex.pm/packages/ash_authentication) This data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-82759). </details> --- ### Superlinear base62 decoding exhausts CPU and memory in AshAuthentication API key sign-in [CVE-2026-82760](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82760) / EEF-CVE-2026-82760 / [GHSA-q876-xr24-2mcx](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q876-xr24-2mcx) <details> <summary>More information</summary> #### Details ##### Summary Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an unauthenticated attacker to exhaust CPU and memory via an oversized base62 segment in a submitted API key. `AshAuthentication.Base.decode62/1` in `lib/ash_authentication/base.ex` splits its argument into one binary per character and folds it with `charval62/2`, which recomputes `Integer.pow(62, index)` at every position instead of accumulating by Horner's method, so cost grows roughly cubically in the input length. `bindecode62/1` in the same module is quadratic through `Integer.undigits/2` and `Integer.digits/2`. Neither function caps `byte_size/1`, and `AshAuthentication.Strategy.ApiKey.SignInPreparation` passes the underscore-separated segments of the submitted key straight into both, before any key lookup and without prior authentication. The surrounding `rescue` clauses catch exceptions, not CPU or memory exhaustion. This issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.8.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14. #### Severity - CVSS Score: 8.2 / 10 (High) - Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N` #### References - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-q876-xr24-2mcx](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-q876-xr24-2mcx) - [https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-82760.html](https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-82760.html) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/f3a53f480088419788d5c3934af3131fa9066773](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/f3a53f480088419788d5c3934af3131fa9066773) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/d5a5d4cb5cc17fbd6e2a120a6111b47accad4b8e](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/d5a5d4cb5cc17fbd6e2a120a6111b47accad4b8e) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/dfb19c897853686ab481c5e773f7a1a0c74dea04](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/dfb19c897853686ab481c5e773f7a1a0c74dea04) - [https://hex.pm/packages/ash_authentication](https://hex.pm/packages/ash_authentication) This data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-82760). </details> --- ### Magic link single-use tokens replayable via TOCTOU race in AshAuthentication [CVE-2026-82761](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82761) / EEF-CVE-2026-82761 / [GHSA-23gr-vcp4-r27q](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-23gr-vcp4-r27q) <details> <summary>More information</summary> #### Details ##### Summary Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an attacker holding a leaked magic link to replay its single-use token and authenticate as the target subject. A magic link configured with `single_use_token?`, which is the default, is meant to be redeemable exactly once, but nothing serialises the token's validity check against its consumption, so concurrent redemptions of one token all succeed and each yields a full user token. Sign-in verifies the JWT with `Jwt.verify/4` and revokes it only afterwards: `AshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.SignInPreparation` revokes in a `Query.after_action` callback, and `AshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.SignInChange` in an `after_transaction` hook that runs once the sign-in has already committed. `AshAuthentication.TokenResource.Actions.revoke/3` writes the revocation as an upsert, so a concurrent duplicate revocation silently succeeds instead of conflicting and no request ever loses the race. This issue affects ash_authentication: from 3.9.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14. #### Severity - CVSS Score: 9.1 / 10 (Critical) - Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N` #### References - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-23gr-vcp4-r27q](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-23gr-vcp4-r27q) - [https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-82761.html](https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-82761.html) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/cf3d227ef25912cf1b0c5fa80f20001f5c46a102](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/cf3d227ef25912cf1b0c5fa80f20001f5c46a102) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/18dfdb36c14aa6a61df8572bce2d5ec36b1d9840](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/18dfdb36c14aa6a61df8572bce2d5ec36b1d9840) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/9ef6864b8833d3b795427a7b8dc518a4997d41ab](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/9ef6864b8833d3b795427a7b8dc518a4997d41ab) - [https://hex.pm/packages/ash_authentication](https://hex.pm/packages/ash_authentication) This data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-82761). </details> --- ### `require_confirmed_with` is not enforced on the action and fails open on an unreadable attribute in AshAuthentication [CVE-2026-85500](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-85500) / EEF-CVE-2026-85500 / [GHSA-fc47-6pgw-wh22](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-fc47-6pgw-wh22) <details> <summary>More information</summary> #### Details ##### Summary Authentication Bypass by Primary Weakness vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an unconfirmed user to obtain a session, defeating a mandatory email confirmation requirement. `AshAuthentication.Strategy.Password.Actions.check_user/2` decides whether the attribute named by `require_confirmed_with` is set using a bare `is_nil(Map.get(user, value))`. When that attribute is not selected on the loaded record `Map.get/2` returns `%Ash.NotLoaded{}`, and when a field policy denies it for the current actor it returns `%Ash.ForbiddenField{}`. Neither is `nil`, so the rejection branch is skipped and sign-i `require_confirmed_with` is enforced in two places, and neither holds in every configuration. `sign_in_with_token` and `register` are checked only inside `AshAuthentication.Strategy.Password.Actions`, not on the action itself, so any caller that invokes the action directly skips the check. An API layer such as `AshGraphql` or `AshJsonApi` invokes the action directly, so this applies to the default configuration. Where a check does run it compares the confirmation attribute against `nil`. That attribute holds `%Ash.NotLoaded{}` or `%Ash.ForbiddenField{}` when it sets `select_by_default?: false`, when an API layer narrows the read's `select`, or when a field policy hides it from the sign-in actor. Neither struct is `nil`, so those configurations read every user as confirmed. This issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.3.8 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14. #### Severity - CVSS Score: 9.1 / 10 (Critical) - Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N` #### References - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-fc47-6pgw-wh22](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-fc47-6pgw-wh22) - [https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-85500.html](https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-85500.html) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/7d37bc6e4df6697b5813d2f373f0fdb08f813f98](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/7d37bc6e4df6697b5813d2f373f0fdb08f813f98) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/17f4c25a372d1778c9cc457759e6357570d83711](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/17f4c25a372d1778c9cc457759e6357570d83711) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/1076639a9d40213088d110c79ba6735b8cc85b16](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/1076639a9d40213088d110c79ba6735b8cc85b16) - [https://hex.pm/packages/ash_authentication](https://hex.pm/packages/ash_authentication) This data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-85500). </details> --- ### Log injection via an unescaped password reset identity in AshAuthentication [CVE-2026-86522](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86522) / EEF-CVE-2026-86522 / [GHSA-wg7g-r393-vr3g](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wg7g-r393-vr3g) <details> <summary>More information</summary> #### Details ##### Summary Improper Output Neutralization for Logs vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an unauthenticated attacker to forge application log entries by submitting a password reset identity containing newlines or control characters. `AshAuthentication.Strategy.Password.RequestPasswordReset.run/3` interpolates the `identity` argument, the email or username taken straight from the reset request, into its `Logger.warning/1` heredocs without escaping, truncating or type-restricting it. The resource logged beside it is passed through `inspect/1`, which would have neutralized the value. A newline in the identity therefore ends the log record, and everything after it is written as a line of its own, so an attacker chooses the severity tag and the content of entries that appear to have come from the application. This issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.2.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14. #### Severity - CVSS Score: 6.3 / 10 (Medium) - Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N` #### References - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-wg7g-r393-vr3g](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-wg7g-r393-vr3g) - [https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-86522.html](https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-86522.html) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/3954f277929712755aef57a4a3a821688f121316](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/3954f277929712755aef57a4a3a821688f121316) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/fd19358bf0eee53ef13dcf17cc499bd4fb393981](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/fd19358bf0eee53ef13dcf17cc499bd4fb393981) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/57c7cc3236bef0fa9da19cb315414f216488866d](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/57c7cc3236bef0fa9da19cb315414f216488866d) - [https://hex.pm/packages/ash_authentication](https://hex.pm/packages/ash_authentication) This data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-86522). </details> --- ### Revoked session accepted because the session jti is never checked in AshAuthentication and AshAuthentication Phoenix [CVE-2026-86533](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86533) / EEF-CVE-2026-86533 / [GHSA-m6x4-4gvp-xwjr](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-m6x4-4gvp-xwjr) <details> <summary>More information</summary> #### Details ##### Summary Insufficient Session Expiration vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication and AshAuthentication Phoenix allows a revoked session to remain fully authenticated. A resource configured with `session_identifier :jti` and `require_token_presence_for_authentication?` disabled stores its session value as `<jti>:<subject>`. The `jti` is there so that signing out can revoke that one session. Neither reader consults it: `AshAuthentication.Plug.Helpers.authenticate_resource_from_session/4` and `AshAuthentication.Phoenix.LiveSession.on_mount/4` both split the value with `split_identifier/2`, discard the `jti` and pass the bare subject to `AshAuthentication.subject_to_user/3`, which reloads the record. The token-presence branch of each function does check its token, calling `AshAuthentication.TokenResource.Actions.get_token/3` with the `jti` and the purpose `user`. Because the revocation record is never read, neither its revoked state nor its expiry constrains the session, so a session captured before sign-out keeps working. This issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.9.1 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14; ash_authentication_phoenix: from 2.10.0 before 2.17.4 and from 3.0.0-rc.0 before 3.0.0-rc.11. #### Severity - CVSS Score: 9.1 / 10 (Critical) - Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N` #### References - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication_phoenix/security/advisories/GHSA-m6x4-4gvp-xwjr](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication_phoenix/security/advisories/GHSA-m6x4-4gvp-xwjr) - [https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-86533.html](https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-86533.html) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-w374-hvrx-66hg](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-w374-hvrx-66hg) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/fcaeb73f76f8f2e9aef8bf637690d2a20dd97596](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/fcaeb73f76f8f2e9aef8bf637690d2a20dd97596) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/a3f49f758f013d2ff086dd9c5ef2d94e921711b4](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/a3f49f758f013d2ff086dd9c5ef2d94e921711b4) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/e28e911caa9728d76329afdb0fb26742ffe4eeef](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/e28e911caa9728d76329afdb0fb26742ffe4eeef) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication_phoenix/commit/a3253fb4fc7145aeb403537af1c24d3a8d51ffb1](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication_phoenix/commit/a3253fb4fc7145aeb403537af1c24d3a8d51ffb1) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication_phoenix/commit/0135217e34e621dac79ae3d9559aeee49304b0aa](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication_phoenix/commit/0135217e34e621dac79ae3d9559aeee49304b0aa) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication_phoenix/commit/f7ab005a2aac09707a25521653c94893d328cc52](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication_phoenix/commit/f7ab005a2aac09707a25521653c94893d328cc52) - [https://hex.pm/packages/ash_authentication](https://hex.pm/packages/ash_authentication) - [https://hex.pm/packages/ash_authentication_phoenix](https://hex.pm/packages/ash_authentication_phoenix) This data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-86533). </details> --- ### Session id is not renewed on authentication in ash_authentication, allowing session fixation [CVE-2026-86688](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86688) / EEF-CVE-2026-86688 / [GHSA-v577-944g-7h3x](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-v577-944g-7h3x) <details> <summary>More information</summary> #### Details ##### Summary Session Fixation vulnerability in team-alembic ash_authentication allows an attacker who can plant a session identifier in a victim's browser to hold an authenticated session once that victim signs in. `AshAuthentication.Plug.Helpers.store_in_session/2` writes the authenticated subject into the existing session with `Plug.Conn.put_session/3` and never calls `Plug.Conn.configure_session(renew: true)`, so the identifier the visitor arrived with carries into their authenticated session. Every authentication event reaches this one function: the default `success/4` injected by `AshAuthentication.Phoenix.Controller.__using__/1`, the `AuthController` emitted by `mix ash_authentication_phoenix.install`, and remember-me auto-login. `AshAuthentication.Phoenix.Plug.store_in_session/2` is a `defdelegate` to it. Logout does not close the window either, because `clear_session/2` ends with `Plug.Conn.clear_session/1`, which clears session contents but leaves the identifier intact, so a planted identifier survives a logout-then-login cycle. This issue affects ash_authentication: from 0.2.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14. ##### Impact An attacker holding a session identifier they planted before the victim signed in gains that victim's authenticated session, and with it full account takeover, in deployments using a server-side session store. ##### Workarounds Call `Plug.Conn.configure_session(conn, renew: true)` in your own `success/4` before `store_in_session/2`. This is a one-line change in application code and closes the controller sign-in path, though not remember-me auto-login, which does not pass through application code. Add `Plug.Conn.configure_session(conn, drop: true)` at sign-out so a planted identifier does not survive a logout-then-login cycle. ##### Configurations Exploitation for account takeover requires a server-side session store (ETS, Mnesia, Redis or a database), where the cookie carries a stable session identifier, and a position from which the attacker can plant that cookie in the victim's browser: cookie tossing from a sibling subdomain, an HTTP host without HSTS, or a shared or kiosk browser. Phoenix defaults to the signed cookie store, and neither package's installer changes it. Under that store the authenticated session lives in the re-signed cookie delivered only to the victim, so a planted pre-authentication copy does not become an authenticated session. Attacker-planted session contents, such as a `return_to` value, still survive into the authenticated session there. #### Severity - CVSS Score: 7.4 / 10 (High) - Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N` #### References - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-v577-944g-7h3x](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-v577-944g-7h3x) - [https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-86688.html](https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-86688.html) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/a939dde9b917c072cdf10c4b0913a9886a4b0231](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/a939dde9b917c072cdf10c4b0913a9886a4b0231) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/872db454405ecad4fcdabd9ff3d8755d1d6a69ae](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/872db454405ecad4fcdabd9ff3d8755d1d6a69ae) - [https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/3e1d452cbf1564e87f5f97be882b66fe25af7cfa](https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/3e1d452cbf1564e87f5f97be882b66fe25af7cfa) - [https://hex.pm/packages/ash_authentication](https://hex.pm/packages/ash_authentication) This data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-86688). </details> --- ### Configuration 📅 **Schedule**: (UTC) - Branch creation - At any time (no schedule defined) - Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined) 🚦 **Automerge**: Disabled by config. 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chore(deps): update dependency ash_authentication to ~> 4.15.0 [security]
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### ⚠️ Artifact update problem Renovate failed to update an artifact related to this branch. You probably do not want to merge this PR as-is. ♻ Renovate will retry this branch, including artifacts, only when one of the following happens: - any of the package files in this branch needs updating, or - the branch becomes conflicted, or - you click the rebase/retry checkbox if found above, or - you rename this PR's title to start with "rebase!" to trigger it manually The artifact failure details are included below: ##### File name: mix.lock ``` Command failed: install-tool elixir v1.20.4 ```
renovate changed title from chore(deps): update dependency ash_authentication to ~> 4.15.0 [security] to chore(deps): update dependency ash_authentication to ~> 4.15.0 [security] - autoclosed 2026-10-08 13:07:59 +02:00
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