chore(deps): update dependency ash_authentication to ~> 4.15.0 [security] - autoclosed #568
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This PR contains the following updates:
~> 4.13.0→~> 4.15.0OAuth2/OIDC account takeover in AshAuthentication via email-based user matching
CVE-2026-49757 / EEF-CVE-2026-49757 / GHSA-777c-2fxx-qr28
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Details
Summary
Authentication Bypass by Spoofing vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows account takeover of local users via OAuth2/OIDC sign-in.
AshAuthentication's OAuth2 and OIDC family strategies matched the local user by email address (an upsert on the email field, or a user-defined sign-in filter) rather than by the OpenID Connect iss/sub claim combination. Per OpenID Connect Core §5.7, only iss/sub uniquely and stably identifies an end-user; other claims, including email, MUST NOT be used as unique identifiers.
A provider login presenting a victim's email, including an unverified email, a reused email, or an account with email_verified: false, resolved to and signed in as the victim's existing local account. An unauthenticated attacker who can register an account on any accepted OAuth provider with the victim's email (or who benefits from provider-side email reuse or reclamation) obtains the victim's full local privileges.
The fix resolves users by the (strategy, sub) identity stored in a user identity resource, and only links a new sub to an existing local account by email when the provider's email_verified claim is trusted (trust_email_verified?).
This issue affects ash_authentication from 0.1.0 before 4.14.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.10.
Severity
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NReferences
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AshAuthentication vulnerable to OAuth2/OIDC account takeover via email-based user matching
CVE-2026-49757 / EEF-CVE-2026-49757 / GHSA-777c-2fxx-qr28
More information
Details
Summary
AshAuthentication's OAuth2 and OIDC family strategies matched the local user by email address rather than by the OpenID Connect
iss/subclaim combination. A provider login presenting a victim's email (including an unverified, reused, oremail_verified: falseaccount) resolved to and signed in as the victim's existing local account. An unauthenticated attacker who can register an account on any accepted OAuth provider with the victim's email obtains the victim's full local privileges.Details
Per OpenID Connect Core §5.7, only the
iss/subclaim combination uniquely and stably identifies an end-user; any other claim, includingemail, MUST NOT be used as a unique identifier. AshAuthentication's OAuth2/OIDC register flow nonetheless drove the upsert by the email field (upsert_identityon email, or a user-defined sign-in filter), and the sign-in preparation filtered users by email.1. Provider login. The attacker signs in to a configured OAuth/OIDC provider with the victim's email. This is trivial for providers that don't verify email ownership, and possible under email-reuse / reclamation for providers that do.
2. AshAuthentication register step.
'Elixir.AshAuthentication.Strategy.OAuth2.IdentityChange':change/3invokes the upsert action whoseupsert_identityresolves on the email. The action lands on the victim's existing record.3. Sign-in preparation.
'Elixir.AshAuthentication.Strategy.OAuth2.SignInPreparation':prepare/3does not verify the returned user against aniss/subidentity, so the attacker is authenticated as the victim.Configurations
Exploitation requires one of:
Providers that strictly verify email ownership and forbid reuse (e.g. modern Google Workspace, GitHub for accounts that have completed verification) are not directly exploitable, but applications that accept any of the affected strategy types in addition are still exposed via the weaker providers in the set.
PoC
Impact
Unauthenticated remote account takeover against any AshAuthentication-using application that exposes an OAuth2/OIDC strategy. The default configuration of every affected strategy is vulnerable; no application-level misconfiguration is required. An attacker who succeeds gains the victim's full local identity, with read, write, and destructive access to whatever the victim's account can do.
References
github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication@c5f589058egithub.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication@728b8d28c1github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication@64530644f9Severity
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Purpose-limited JWT accepted as full bearer authentication in AshAuthentication
CVE-2026-65633 / EEF-CVE-2026-65633 / GHSA-6vcj-3h59-rrc3
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Details
Summary
Improper Authentication vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows purpose-limited JWTs to be replayed as full bearer API credentials when a resource uses stateless bearer-token verification.
The bearer-token authentication helper
AshAuthentication.Plug.Helpers.retrieve_from_bearer/3verifies anAuthorization: BearerJWT's signature and rejects tokens containing anactclaim, but performs no check that the token'spurposeclaim equalsuserat the bearer boundary. When the resource is configured withrequire_token_presence_for_authentication?: false(the DSL default), the follow-onvalidate_token/3helper returns{:ok, nil}without consulting the token resource, so no downstream check onpurposetakes place either. As a result, any valid, non-expired JWT the library itself issued for a narrow, single-purpose flow (most notably thepurpose: sign_intoken that WebAuthn always emits during sign-in, and that the Password strategy emits when sign-in tokens are enabled) is accepted directly as a general-purpose bearer credential and resolves to a fullcurrent_userassignment.This bypasses the library's intended token-exchange contract, in which the
sign_intoken is meant to be presented exactly once to a preparation that validates thepurposeclaim and immediately revokes the token. The first use of a still-valid sign-in token presented directly in theAuthorizationheader succeeds because the stateless bearer path never scopes it topurpose == "user".An attacker who obtains a not-yet-exchanged sign-in token for a target subject (for example via log or referrer leakage, an intercepted magic-link delivery channel, or a partially compromised intermediary) can present it as a bearer token and be authenticated as that subject, fully bypassing the intended one-time-use and revocation semantics. Exploitation additionally requires that the host application wire up
retrieve_from_bearer/3on a reachable route and uses either WebAuthn (sign-in tokens are always issued) or the Password strategy withsign_in_tokens_enabled?: true. Resources configured withrequire_token_presence_for_authentication?: true(including applications scaffolded by the Igniter installer since v4.5.0) and the session-based path (authenticate_resource_from_session/4) enforcepurpose == "user"against the stored token record and are not affected.This issue affects ash_authentication: from 3.10.5 before 4.14.2 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.13.
Configurations
The bypass is reachable only when a resource uses stateless bearer-token verification, i.e.
require_token_presence_for_authentication?isfalse(the DSL default). In that modevalidate_token/3returns{:ok, nil}without consulting the token resource, so the JWT'spurposeclaim is the only remaining scoping signal at the bearer boundary and it is never checked. Whenrequire_token_presence_for_authentication?istrue,validate_token/3looks the token up withget_token(%{"jti" => jti, "purpose" => "user"}); purpose-limited tokens are stored under their own purpose (sign_in,remember_me, ...), so that lookup fails and those tokens are rejected. Applications scaffolded by the Igniter installer since v4.5.0 default torequire_token_presence_for_authentication?: trueand are therefore not exposed as generated; applications configured manually or that deliberately opt into stateless JWT verification are.Exploitation additionally requires the host application to wire up
AshAuthentication.Plug.Helpers.retrieve_from_bearer/3on a route the attacker can reach, and to use a strategy that issues purpose-limited JWTs carrying a resolvablesubclaim: either the WebAuthn strategy (sign-in tokens are always emitted, no opt-in required) or the Password strategy withsign_in_tokens_enabled?: true. The session-based path (authenticate_resource_from_session/4) already enforcespurpose == "user"against the token resource and is not affected.Severity
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NReferences
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Reflected XSS in AshAuthentication confirmation and magic link interaction forms
CVE-2026-66882 / EEF-CVE-2026-66882 / GHSA-54fc-x3hv-ffhw
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Details
Summary
Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS) vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows reflected cross-site scripting via the confirmation and magic link interaction forms.
When a strategy is configured with
require_interaction?set totrue, AshAuthentication serves an intermediate HTML page asking the user to confirm the action by submitting a form. Both such pages embed a request parameter directly into a hidden input'svalueattribute without HTML escaping:lib/ash_authentication/add_ons/confirmation/confirmation_form.html.eexinterpolates theconfirmparameter, andlib/ash_authentication/strategies/magic_link/sign_in_form.html.eexinterpolates the magic link token parameter. These templates are compiled withEEx.function_from_file/3using plain<%= %>expressions, which perform no escaping, so the parameter is reflected verbatim.Neither accept handler validates the value before rendering it.
AshAuthentication.AddOn.Confirmation.Plug.accept/2only checks that aconfirmkey is present, andAshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.Plug.accept/2reads the parameter directly, so no token signature is verified at this stage and arbitrary attacker-supplied text reaches the template. An unauthenticated attacker can therefore craft a URL whose parameter terminates the attribute and injects markup, for example a quote followed by a<script>element. Because the accept phase is served over GET, loading the crafted link is sufficient; no form submission or prior authentication is required.The injected script executes in the origin of the application embedding AshAuthentication, giving it access to that origin's cookies, session, and same-origin responses. Since these pages are part of the authentication flow, a victim following what appears to be a legitimate confirmation or sign-in link is a plausible target.
This issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.8.0 before 4.14.2 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.13.
Configurations
Only strategies configured with
require_interaction?set totrueare affected. This option defaults tofalse, and when it is disabled the vulnerable accept route is not registered at all, so the affected pages cannot be reached.The option is not obscure: AshAuthentication's own documentation for the confirmation add-on advises that applications using AshAuthenticationPhoenix should enable it, so the affected configuration is a documented and recommended deployment rather than an unusual one.
At least one of the following must be configured with
require_interaction? true:confirmationadd-on, which serves the affected confirmation accept form; ormagic_linkstrategy, which serves the affected sign-in accept form.Severity
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:NReferences
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Remember-me sign-in guard reads a session key that is never written in ash_authentication, allowing session replacement
CVE-2026-76949 / EEF-CVE-2026-76949 / GHSA-hh34-374j-pfr5
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Details
Summary
Authentication Bypass by Spoofing vulnerability in team-alembic ash_authentication allows an attacker who can plant a remember-me cookie in a victim's browser to replace that victim's authenticated session with one for the attacker's own account.
AshAuthentication.Plug.Helpers.sign_in_using_remember_me/3skips re-authenticating an already-signed-in visitor by checking the session for"<subject_name>_token", butstore_in_session/2writes that key only whenrequire_token_presence_for_authentication?is enabled and otherwise writes the bare subject name. At the default setting the guard therefore reads a key that is never written, its already-signed-in branch is unreachable, and the remember-me sign-in runs on every request through the per-request browser pipeline plug. A planted remember-me cookie is consequently honoured even for a visitor holding a live authenticated session, so whatever the victim enters afterwards lands in data the attacker controls. The read path inauthenticate_resource_from_session/4selects the key correctly, so the guard and the reader disagree about which key holds the session.This issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.10.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.
Impact
An attacker who can set a remember-me cookie in a victim's browser silently replaces the victim's authenticated session with one for the attacker's own account, so data the victim subsequently enters is written to records the attacker controls. The victim is given no indication their identity changed.
Workarounds
Set
require_token_presence_for_authentication? trueon the authenticated resource's token configuration.store_in_session/2then writes the key the guard reads, so the already-signed-in branch fires and the remember-me sign-in no longer runs against a live session. Note this changes session storage semantics for the whole application and requires a token resource.Otherwise remove the remember-me plug from the browser pipeline, which disables remember-me auto-login entirely.
Configurations
The application must enable the
remember_mestrategy and run its per-request plug in the browser pipeline, withrequire_token_presence_for_authentication?at its default offalse. Enabling that setting makes the guard read the key the session actually holds, which closes the issue.The attacker also needs a position from which to set a cookie in the victim's browser, such as cookie tossing from a sibling subdomain, an HTTP host without HSTS, or a shared or kiosk browser.
Severity
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NReferences
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Token revocation record built from unverified JWT claims in AshAuthentication
CVE-2026-78223 / EEF-CVE-2026-78223 / GHSA-mfwg-5cpf-px58
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Details
Summary
Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows a caller of the token revocation action to neutralise a revocation or write arbitrary rows into the token resource.
AshAuthentication.TokenResource.RevokeTokenChange.change/3reads the:tokenargument and decodes it withAshAuthentication.Jwt.peek/1, which delegates toJoken.peek_claims/1and performs no signature check, unlikeJwt.verify/4. Thejti,expandsubclaims it returns are written straight onto the revocation record, guarded only bybyte_size(token) > 0. Becauseexpires_atderives from the attacker-chosenexp, a forged copy of a genuine token that keeps the realjtibut backdatesexpyields a revocation row that is already expired:expunge_expiredremoves it and the genuine token passesrevoked?again. Arbitraryjtiandsubvalues can be inserted the same way.This issue affects ash_authentication: from 0.2.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.
Severity
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NReferences
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Sign-in token minted for one resource accepted by another in AshAuthentication
CVE-2026-80218 / EEF-CVE-2026-80218 / GHSA-3pr8-f99q-86hp
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Details
Summary
Improper Authentication vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an attacker holding a sign-in token for one authenticated resource to be signed in as a user of a different resource.
AshAuthentication.Strategy.Password.SignInWithTokenPreparation.extract_primary_keys_from_subject/2parses the JWTsubclaim (for exampleuser?id=1) withURI.parse/1and keeps only its query string, discarding the path segment that names the subject the token was issued for. Nothing else restores that binding:AshAuthentication.Jwt.verify/3checks the signature,exp,nbf,jtiand the library-version claims, the purpose check only requiressign_in, and the remaining comparison is over primary-key field names, which are identical across resources. The WebAuthn sign-in and remember-me preparations carry copies of the same helper and drop the path in the same way. The magic link sign-in path pins the subject name against the resource and is not affected.This issue affects ash_authentication: from 3.10.5 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.
Severity
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NReferences
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Single-use sign-in token placed in a redirect query string in AshAuthenticationPhoenix
CVE-2026-81632 / EEF-CVE-2026-81632 / GHSA-8jh5-339h-mqx9
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Details
Summary
Use of HTTP Request With Sensitive Query String vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthenticationPhoenix allows someone able to read access logs, proxy logs or browser history to recover a single-use sign-in token and authenticate as its owner.
After a successful password sign-in,
AshAuthentication.Phoenix.Components.Password.SignInFormbuilds thesign_in_with_tokenpath with the freshly issueduser.__metadata__.tokenas a query parameter and redirects the browser to it with a GET. The token therefore travels in the request line, where web servers, reverse proxies, request telemetry and the browser's own history record it, all of which outlive the request and are ordinarily less protected than session storage. The redirect destination is restricted to a local path, so this is not an open redirect; the exposure is the retention of a live credential.This issue affects ash_authentication_phoenix: from 1.7.0 before 2.17.4 and from 3.0.0-rc.0 before 3.0.0-rc.11; ash_authentication: from 3.10.5 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.
Severity
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NReferences
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Replayable OAuth2 CSRF state retained after a failed callback in AshAuthentication
CVE-2026-81637 / EEF-CVE-2026-81637 / GHSA-3vcj-gxx8-3p44
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Details
Summary
Insufficient Session Expiration vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an attacker who obtains a victim's OAuth2
statevalue to replay the callback and sign that victim into an attacker-controlled account.AshAuthentication.Strategy.OAuth2.Plug.callback/2clears the storedsession_paramsthrough a rebinding step inside itswithchain,conn <- delete_session(conn, session_key). Elixir evaluates theelseblock in the scope enclosing thewith, so every failure path (the provider returning?error=access_denied, an invalid code, a token-exchange error, or a registration or sign-in failure) reachesstore_authentication_result/2holding the original connection and the session entry is never removed. The value the module's own comment describes as protection against a CSRF-related attack is therefore consumed only when authentication succeeds, and survives a cancelled or failed attempt until the next request phase or session expiry.This issue affects ash_authentication: from 0.6.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.
Severity
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NReferences
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Confirmation token accepted on any record in AshAuthentication
CVE-2026-82685 / EEF-CVE-2026-82685 / GHSA-g636-26vf-2w63
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Details
Summary
Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an authenticated attacker to overwrite and confirm another user's email address, and so take over that account. A confirmation token issued to one user is accepted on any other user's record.
AshAuthentication.AddOn.Confirmation.ConfirmChangeverifies the token's signature and itsactclaim, then applies the changes stored against that token to whichever record the changeset targets, never comparing thesubclaim againstchangeset.data. An attacker who registers an account and changes their own email replays the resulting token against a victim's record id, writing in their own address withforce_change_attributes/2and stampingconfirmed_at, after which an ordinary password reset yields the account. The library's own confirmation flow is unaffected, becauseAshAuthentication.AddOn.Confirmation.Actions.confirm/3resolvessubto a user and targets that record.This issue affects ash_authentication: from 0.5.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.
Severity
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NReferences
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Actor record with password digest stored in AshAuthentication audit log entries
CVE-2026-82723 / EEF-CVE-2026-82723 / GHSA-59wx-q3r8-ghv4
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Details
Summary
Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows disclosure of user password digests to readers of the audit store.
The
audit_logadd-on builds each entry'sextra_datainAshAuthentication.AddOn.AuditLog.Auditor.build_extra_data/4, which takes:actorfrom the action callback context verbatim. Any audited action invoked withactor:set to a user record therefore deposits that record, including itshashed_passwordattribute, into the audit entry. The same module already collapses the audited identity to an opaque string viaAshAuthentication.user_to_subject/1and filtersparamsagainst the strategy's configured allow-list, so the actor is the only stored value that reaches the audit store unfiltered. Marking the attributesensitive?: truedoes not help, because that redactsinspect/1output rather than JSON encoding or raw-term storage.There is no attacker-controlled trigger and no network disclosure path: entries accumulate from ordinary authenticated activity, and an attacker's own requests deposit only their own digest. Exploitation requires independent read access to the audit store, such as database credentials, an audit role, a backup, or a log shipper, at which point the digests support offline password attack against every active account. Whether the material persists depends on the data layer, since raw-term stores keep it verbatim while a SQL store raises
Protocol.UndefinedErrorand drops the entry unless the user resource derivesJason.Encoder.This issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.12.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.2.
Severity
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NReferences
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Reversible IP address pseudonymisation in AshAuthentication audit log hash mode
CVE-2026-82759 / EEF-CVE-2026-82759 / GHSA-cgqj-pcpq-xhfm
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Details
Summary
Use of a One-Way Hash with a Predictable Salt vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows readers of the audit store to recover the client IP addresses that the audit log add-on's
:hashprivacy mode is meant to pseudonymise.AshAuthentication.AddOn.AuditLog.IpPrivacy.hash_ip/1computes a single unkeyed:crypto.hash(:sha256, salt <> ip)and truncates the result to 16 hexadecimal characters. The salt is read from the:audit_log_ip_saltor:secretapplication config keys, and falls back to the constant"default-salt-change-in-production"published in the library source when neither is set, with nothing warning that the default is in use. The IPv4 space is only 2^32 values and SHA-256 is fast, so the whole hash table is precomputable and every stored value maps back to its source address. Truncating to 16 characters does not help, and even a configured salt leaves the hash cheap enough to enumerate once it leaks.This issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.12.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.
Configurations
Only applications that enable the
audit_logadd-on and set itsip_privacymode to:hashstore the affected value. Other modes (:none,:truncate,:exclude) do not reachhash_ip/1.The complete break additionally requires the default salt, that is neither
:audit_log_ip_saltnor:secretconfigured under the:ash_authenticationapplication. This is the out-of-the-box state: no warning or error is raised when the hardcoded salt is in use.Severity
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NReferences
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Superlinear base62 decoding exhausts CPU and memory in AshAuthentication API key sign-in
CVE-2026-82760 / EEF-CVE-2026-82760 / GHSA-q876-xr24-2mcx
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Details
Summary
Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an unauthenticated attacker to exhaust CPU and memory via an oversized base62 segment in a submitted API key.
AshAuthentication.Base.decode62/1inlib/ash_authentication/base.exsplits its argument into one binary per character and folds it withcharval62/2, which recomputesInteger.pow(62, index)at every position instead of accumulating by Horner's method, so cost grows roughly cubically in the input length.bindecode62/1in the same module is quadratic throughInteger.undigits/2andInteger.digits/2. Neither function capsbyte_size/1, andAshAuthentication.Strategy.ApiKey.SignInPreparationpasses the underscore-separated segments of the submitted key straight into both, before any key lookup and without prior authentication. The surroundingrescueclauses catch exceptions, not CPU or memory exhaustion.This issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.8.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.
Severity
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NReferences
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Magic link single-use tokens replayable via TOCTOU race in AshAuthentication
CVE-2026-82761 / EEF-CVE-2026-82761 / GHSA-23gr-vcp4-r27q
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Details
Summary
Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an attacker holding a leaked magic link to replay its single-use token and authenticate as the target subject. A magic link configured with
single_use_token?, which is the default, is meant to be redeemable exactly once, but nothing serialises the token's validity check against its consumption, so concurrent redemptions of one token all succeed and each yields a full user token.Sign-in verifies the JWT with
Jwt.verify/4and revokes it only afterwards:AshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.SignInPreparationrevokes in aQuery.after_actioncallback, andAshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.SignInChangein anafter_transactionhook that runs once the sign-in has already committed.AshAuthentication.TokenResource.Actions.revoke/3writes the revocation as an upsert, so a concurrent duplicate revocation silently succeeds instead of conflicting and no request ever loses the race.This issue affects ash_authentication: from 3.9.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.
Severity
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NReferences
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require_confirmed_withis not enforced on the action and fails open on an unreadable attribute in AshAuthenticationCVE-2026-85500 / EEF-CVE-2026-85500 / GHSA-fc47-6pgw-wh22
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Details
Summary
Authentication Bypass by Primary Weakness vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an unconfirmed user to obtain a session, defeating a mandatory email confirmation requirement.
AshAuthentication.Strategy.Password.Actions.check_user/2decides whether the attribute named byrequire_confirmed_withis set using a bareis_nil(Map.get(user, value)). When that attribute is not selected on the loaded recordMap.get/2returns%Ash.NotLoaded{}, and when a field policy denies it for the current actor it returns%Ash.ForbiddenField{}. Neither isnil, so the rejection branch is skipped and sign-irequire_confirmed_withis enforced in two places, and neither holds in everyconfiguration.
sign_in_with_tokenandregisterare checked only insideAshAuthentication.Strategy.Password.Actions, not on the action itself, so any callerthat invokes the action directly skips the check. An API layer such as
AshGraphqlorAshJsonApiinvokes the action directly, so this applies to the default configuration.Where a check does run it compares the confirmation attribute against
nil. Thatattribute holds
%Ash.NotLoaded{}or%Ash.ForbiddenField{}when it setsselect_by_default?: false, when an API layer narrows the read'sselect, or when afield policy hides it from the sign-in actor. Neither struct is
nil, so thoseconfigurations read every user as confirmed.
This issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.3.8 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.
Severity
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NReferences
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Log injection via an unescaped password reset identity in AshAuthentication
CVE-2026-86522 / EEF-CVE-2026-86522 / GHSA-wg7g-r393-vr3g
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Details
Summary
Improper Output Neutralization for Logs vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an unauthenticated attacker to forge application log entries by submitting a password reset identity containing newlines or control characters.
AshAuthentication.Strategy.Password.RequestPasswordReset.run/3interpolates theidentityargument, the email or username taken straight from the reset request, into itsLogger.warning/1heredocs without escaping, truncating or type-restricting it. The resource logged beside it is passed throughinspect/1, which would have neutralized the value. A newline in the identity therefore ends the log record, and everything after it is written as a line of its own, so an attacker chooses the severity tag and the content of entries that appear to have come from the application.This issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.2.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.
Severity
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:NReferences
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Revoked session accepted because the session jti is never checked in AshAuthentication and AshAuthentication Phoenix
CVE-2026-86533 / EEF-CVE-2026-86533 / GHSA-m6x4-4gvp-xwjr
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Details
Summary
Insufficient Session Expiration vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication and AshAuthentication Phoenix allows a revoked session to remain fully authenticated.
A resource configured with
session_identifier :jtiandrequire_token_presence_for_authentication?disabled stores its session value as<jti>:<subject>. Thejtiis there so that signing out can revoke that one session. Neither reader consults it:AshAuthentication.Plug.Helpers.authenticate_resource_from_session/4andAshAuthentication.Phoenix.LiveSession.on_mount/4both split the value withsplit_identifier/2, discard thejtiand pass the bare subject toAshAuthentication.subject_to_user/3, which reloads the record. The token-presence branch of each function does check its token, callingAshAuthentication.TokenResource.Actions.get_token/3with thejtiand the purposeuser. Because the revocation record is never read, neither its revoked state nor its expiry constrains the session, so a session captured before sign-out keeps working.This issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.9.1 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14; ash_authentication_phoenix: from 2.10.0 before 2.17.4 and from 3.0.0-rc.0 before 3.0.0-rc.11.
Severity
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NReferences
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Session id is not renewed on authentication in ash_authentication, allowing session fixation
CVE-2026-86688 / EEF-CVE-2026-86688 / GHSA-v577-944g-7h3x
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Details
Summary
Session Fixation vulnerability in team-alembic ash_authentication allows an attacker who can plant a session identifier in a victim's browser to hold an authenticated session once that victim signs in.
AshAuthentication.Plug.Helpers.store_in_session/2writes the authenticated subject into the existing session withPlug.Conn.put_session/3and never callsPlug.Conn.configure_session(renew: true), so the identifier the visitor arrived with carries into their authenticated session. Every authentication event reaches this one function: the defaultsuccess/4injected byAshAuthentication.Phoenix.Controller.__using__/1, theAuthControlleremitted bymix ash_authentication_phoenix.install, and remember-me auto-login.AshAuthentication.Phoenix.Plug.store_in_session/2is adefdelegateto it. Logout does not close the window either, becauseclear_session/2ends withPlug.Conn.clear_session/1, which clears session contents but leaves the identifier intact, so a planted identifier survives a logout-then-login cycle.This issue affects ash_authentication: from 0.2.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.
Impact
An attacker holding a session identifier they planted before the victim signed in gains that victim's authenticated session, and with it full account takeover, in deployments using a server-side session store.
Workarounds
Call
Plug.Conn.configure_session(conn, renew: true)in your ownsuccess/4beforestore_in_session/2. This is a one-line change in application code and closes the controller sign-in path, though not remember-me auto-login, which does not pass through application code.Add
Plug.Conn.configure_session(conn, drop: true)at sign-out so a planted identifier does not survive a logout-then-login cycle.Configurations
Exploitation for account takeover requires a server-side session store (ETS, Mnesia, Redis or a database), where the cookie carries a stable session identifier, and a position from which the attacker can plant that cookie in the victim's browser: cookie tossing from a sibling subdomain, an HTTP host without HSTS, or a shared or kiosk browser.
Phoenix defaults to the signed cookie store, and neither package's installer changes it. Under that store the authenticated session lives in the re-signed cookie delivered only to the victim, so a planted pre-authentication copy does not become an authenticated session. Attacker-planted session contents, such as a
return_tovalue, still survive into the authenticated session there.Severity
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NReferences
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File name: mix.lock
chore(deps): update dependency ash_authentication to ~> 4.15.0 [security]to chore(deps): update dependency ash_authentication to ~> 4.15.0 [security] - autoclosedPull request closed